July 14, 2016
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The CIA has a team of clairvoyants
If the CIA had a crystal ball, then they would probably not be routinely blindsided by world events. Lacking such a device, the agency has endured notable analytical failures. During the early 1990s, sudden collapses of Somalia, Zaire, Rwanda, and the Soviet Union seemingly appeared without warning.
Strategic surprises have always been a problem for intelligence agencies. The material impossibility of having eyes everywhere requires making judgments without seeing a complete picture, let alone the future. Assessing the likeliness of future rare political events has had dubious reliability.
Thus, in 1994, the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence commissioned the Political Instability Task Force (PITF), formerly known as the State Failure Task Force, a clairvoyant-esque squad of social-scientist brainiacs charged with churning global political data into global instability forecasts.
The creation of the PITF began at end of the Cold War. The PITF’s mission is straightforward — make intelligence analysis as holistic as possible, and locate where the next crisis might be, and why.
“The collapse of the Soviet Union completely caught the government off guard. Their models didn’t capture that at all. [Their models] didn’t even accept it,” Monty Marshall, a senior consultant for the PITF and director of the Center for Systemic Peace told War Is Boring.
“The intelligence community was looking for alternative explanations,” he added. “The old way of thinking, wasn’t catching the new dynamics, trends, that don’t fit into the way they understand things.”
To meet this task, the team recruited from American academia and included leading political scientists, sociologists and methodologists. In the beginning, they focused on variables as broad as environmental degradation and social conflict. The focus later shifted to cover four main topics — revolutionary and ethnic civil war onset, adverse regime change, state collapse, and genocide.
PITF calculates each event’s chance of occurring with probabilistic forecasts from six months to two years out, in 167 countries, which the team monitors on a daily basis. Within every country, the PITF’s global model accounts for baseline political dynamics, and disruptions in patterns within these dynamics.
The results of the forecasts hold impressive heuristic accuracy. “[With] what this approach can do — probabilistic models — they’re stuck at about 80 percent accuracy. That’s good. That’s why we’re still around,” Marshall said.
In addition to accurate forecasting, the PITF’s reports inform the intelligence community and U.S. policymakers. According to Marshall, the PITF’s reports are used mainly for the National Intelligence Council’s annual intelligence estimates.
Interestingly, the relationship between military coups and civil wars are closer than previously thought. According to the PITF’s data, government officials will often resort to regime change as a tactic to prevent civil war from occurring.
Thai troops on the streets during the 2010 political crisis | (Null0/Flickr photo/Courtesy of War is Boring)
“A relatively strong government will try [a military coup] to avoid a conflict dynamic that would otherwise lead to civil war,” Marshall said. “Sometimes they are successful at averting civil war and sometimes they are not.”
“We discovered that the lead indicator was an obscure variable in the data, which we call factionalism,” he added. “That is the most powerful driver in the global model, and the most powerful driver at predicting regime change.”
Considering this finding regarding “factionalism” — or oppositional groups that are close to a nation’s leader — could affect analysis of autocratic regimes around the world, including dangerous ones to international security such as Syria, North Korea, and Iran.
“Regime change” as a topic of forecasting is not limited to the PITF’s current global model. Jay Ulfelder, former director of the PITF, currently runs a semi-yearly “Coup Forecasts” analysis with his own predictive model, quantifying the likeliness of coup attempts around the world.
“Over the past few years, most coup attempts have happened in countries in the top 30 on my risk assessments, and often in ones pretty close to the top of those lists,” Ulfeder told War Is Boring via email. “Burkina Faso was fifth with a predicted probability of about 15 percent, and Burundi was 26th with a predicted probability of about 5 percent.”
Burkina Faso and Burundi experienced coup attempts in 2015. If his last forecasts, quantified in 2014, still hold probabilistic weight today, then political analysts should keep an eye on Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, Equatorial-Guinea, and Niger — the most likely places for military coups, according to the data.
Ulfelder’s focus on military coups are due to the relative accuracy in predicting them, as opposed to other types of upheaval.
“Topics like social unrest and the onset of insurgencies have turned out to be harder to forecast well,” he added. “So progress has been uneven.”
Despite the useful applications of the PITF, the relationship between academically inclined forecasters and government consumers has not been without problems.
The academics at PITF seek to improve their social science craft and the expand the furthering of knowledge, while their spy handlers seek quick answers — which the project is not fully suited to provide.
Predicting world politics “is a superficial understanding of it, but that’s what the government wants,” Marshall said. “They’re still working hard, and they can’t get it. We were looking at our understanding of how things work, whereas the intelligence community was looking for something to you know, give them the answers.”
“A cheat sheet, mainly.”
This misunderstanding of what predictive modeling is supposed frustrates Ulfelder as well. Trends point where to look, not what will happen.
“Most of the phenomena studied by social scientists are inherently hard to predict well,” Ulfelder said. “Making a probabilistic forecast is more about trying to quantify our uncertainty than it is about presuming we can be ‘right’ all the time.”
Furthermore, the focus of the intelligence community on data-driven forecasts has resulted in more quantitative methodologists — rather than more social scientists — being added to the PITF team. This shift, according to Marshall, has become problematic.
“The analysts can’t inform the policy community if they get all of their information from the machine. They have to understand the politics that go into the machine.”
Marshall maintains there should be an emphasis on the human elements of forecasting. “There are almost infinite combinations of variables to use in the model. The results are mainly noise, and to identity the signal is the job of the analyst — to separate that from the noise.”
In this vein, the CIA pursues other, more mechanized forecast projects seeking to further automate global trend-casting. The Lockheed Martin managed Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS) derives its abilities from “Big Data,” tapping into the new availability of open source materials provided principally by the Internet.
A Ghanaian peacekeeper in Liberia | (U.N. photo/Courtesy of War is Boring)
But even Big Data methods are far from infallible.